Insights · Comparison
MFA versus phishing-resistant authentication
Conventional MFA adds a second factor such as a code from an app, a text message or a push notification. It stops attackers who have only a password. It does not stop an attacker who tricks the user into entering the code on a fake page, approving a push they did not initiate, or relaying the session through a proxy; those attacks are now routine. Phishing-resistant authentication, such as FIDO2 security keys and platform passkeys, binds the credential to the legitimate site so it cannot be relayed or entered elsewhere. Insurers, regulators and federal guidance increasingly expect it, at least for privileged and remote access.
At a glance
The criteria that decide it.
| Criterion | Conventional MFA | Phishing-resistant authentication |
|---|---|---|
| Stops password-only attacks | Yes | Yes |
| Stops real-time phishing and relay | No | Yes |
| Stops push fatigue | No (push); partly with number matching | Not applicable |
| User experience | Codes and prompts | Touch a key or use the device’s biometric |
| Rollout | Already common | Device and application support required; keys for some users |
| Expected by | Baseline for insurers and customers | Increasingly required for privileged and remote access |
Criteria
Each one, explained.
How each is defeated
Attackers no longer need the password alone. Proxy kits capture the code or the session in real time; push notifications are approved by tired users. Conventional MFA raised the bar; the bar has been cleared. Phishing-resistant methods cannot be relayed because the credential only works with the genuine site.
User experience
Counterintuitively, phishing-resistant methods are often easier: a touch or a biometric instead of a code. Resistance to rollout is usually about device support and key logistics, not user preference.
Rollout
Start with administrators, finance, executives and remote access, where compromise is most consequential. Confirm application support, choose keys or passkeys per population, and keep conventional MFA as a fallback only where phishing-resistant methods are not yet possible.
Expectations
Insurers ask about MFA specifically and increasingly distinguish phishing-resistant methods. Federal guidance directs agencies and their contractors toward phishing-resistant authentication. Customers’ questionnaires are following.
Recommendation
Who each option suits.
Treat conventional MFA as the floor, not the target. Deploy phishing-resistant authentication for privileged users, remote access and anyone who can move money or data, then extend it to the workforce as applications allow. It is the single control that most reduces the likelihood of the incidents that close businesses.
Related
Where this applies.
Sources
Primary references.
By David Selakovic · Published 2026-10-16 · Revised 2026-10-16 · Reviewed every 180 days